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Commentary: Lessons For Clinton In Truth Commission
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by Deborah Tyroler
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Published: Friday, March 26, 1993
The report released in March by the UN's Truth Commission offers the figure of 75,000 people
killed in the Salvadoran civil war that began in Jimmy Carter times and endured through the
presidencies of Ronald Reagan and George Bush into the early 1990s. The Report also states that
the vast majority of murders and most of the systematic human rights violations were carried out
by US-backed Salvadoran armed forces and police. Leftist guerrillas were also accused of human
rights offenses, but far fewer. As Salvadorans read the document and confront the violence done
to their social order over the past decade and a half, President Clinton would be wise to reflect
as well. He could use the Report to punish those Republican office holders who misled Congress
and the public about the nature of their Salvadoran clients, but such recriminations would be
unworthy of a new president. Rather he might ponder the material so as to avoid the pitfalls that
arise from investing in policies whose premises lie in the notion of religious-type mission rather
than clear interests. The Commission's facts on the security forces' responsibility for murders and
massacres have already been published in newspapers, magazines and books and, indeed, in the
Congressional Record itself. If read in a historical context, however, the Report penetrates to the
nature of US democracy in the national security era. The interesting questions are not what and
when US officials knew about their Salvadoran clients' crimes, but why they covered them up and
felt little obligation to tell the truth to the elected representatives of the American public. The El
Salvador story is eerily repetitious of other episodes in recent history in which unelected national
security officials concocted highly selective information and analysis for release to Congress and the
public. The guideline for this process did not include accuracy, but focused exclusively on support
for "crisis policies" by definition not open for debate. In a society accustomed to having a free press,
such methods can only bring discord and ultimately scandal because there is no foundation for
the idea of "official truth." For four decades of Cold War, war-time security and secrecy norms
became commonplace during peace time. The national security apparatus decided what "facts" the
public should know and which ones to suppress. This crisis mentality carried over to the peripheral
and proxy wars fought by US clients, like the military establishment of South Vietnam in the
1960s and 1970s and El Salvador in the 1980s. The UN report lists massacres, murders, torture and
displacement of population carried out by the Atlacatl Battalion, most of whose officers were trained
by US officials in the United States. Major Eric Buckland, a US military adviser in El Salvador,
did not understand the uproar over the 1990 murders of six Jesuit priests by Salvadoran officers
trained by the US Army. If you advocate human rights in the midst of such a war, Buckland offered,
"you're going to get your butt kicked." Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs
Elliot Abrams illustrated this kind of thinking when he described how he explained to his gradeschool age children what was about to become headline news when he was charged with lying to
Congress ("Undue Process: How Political Differences are Turned into Crime"). The United States,
he began, was "fighting the communists in Nicaragua. Well, I knew lots of secrets about that, and
Secretary [of State George] Shultz and President Reagan didn't want me to tell. Now some people
are saying, you should have told Congress...When they asked you, you had to tell, and not telling
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is a crime. And I'm saying, no it isn't." Like his predecessors, Abrams was not thinking about the
Central American lives that would be lost because of the policy he was backing nor about the effect
of such "lying" on American democracy. He assumed that Cold War crisis axioms overrode the
facts. The premise underlying "official truth" is that the country's mission is so "critical" that extraconstitutional methods are required and that truth must take a back seat to policy expediency. Just
as Presidents Johnson and Nixon had decided in Vietnam that the North Vietnamese communists
would be denied victory, no matter how horrible the alternative, so too officials invented virtues
for "our" Salvadorans, no matter how contrary to the evidence. Reporters like Raymond Bonner
who covered El Salvador for the New York Times and described accurately the El Mozote massacre,
became a target of State Department complaints to the Times publishers: his reports conflicted
with US policy. Bonner was removed from the story. Official truth triumphed. Similar patterns took
place in Vietnam fifteen years earlier when the government tried to influence the major media to
remove reporters who wrote or photographed what they saw. The issue, to paraphrase Groucho
Marx's formulation: Who do you believe, the government or your own eyes? President Clinton may
learn from the Report that lying to Congress to protect a policy can lead to the discrediting not only
of the policy, but the government itself. Through much of the 20th century, US foreign policy has
gone on an almost continual search for foreign monsters. In the pursuit of these enemies we have
destroyed some of the fabric of the republic: the accountability of government to the society much
of it through the media. Beyond confirming the work of courageous journalists, the UN report may
teach the Clinton foreign policy team that official truth must conform with the facts not with the
policy. *Saul Landau is a fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington DC. His new book,
"Guerrilla Wars in Central America," will be published in May 1993 by Weidenfeld and Nicolson.
This commentary is published with permission of the author.
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